The banking literature following the original Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model has assumed that all depositors are ex ante identical. This paper relaxes this assumption by introducing two types of agents. While some agents are uncertain about their liquidity needs at the time they deposit in banks, other agents know exactly at what time they will want to withdraw their funds. Agents who know ex ante that they will want to withdraw in the short term will tend to disrupt the ability of a bank to serve customers who are uncertain about their timing of withdrawal. An adverse selection problem arises, where short-term deposits, which in our model turn out to be detrimental, have the incentive to join the …nancial system and limit, or completely do away with, bank's liquidity provision service. On the other hand, potentially bene…cial long-term funds will not be deposited in banks. Further, when unpredicted short term withdrawal needs are su¢ ciently high, bank reserves are exhausted, and long-term investments need to be disrupted, causing a banking crisis.
Introduction
Following the models of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , the banking literature has assumed that all agents who would potentially deposit in a bank are ex ante identical. In particular, all agents are equally attractive to a bank as potential customers. This paper examines a simple deviation from this assumption. While some agents are uncertain about their liquidity needs at the time they deposit in banks, other agents know exactly at what time they will want to withdraw their funds. Based on the previous literature, one might conjecture that the two types would endogenously segregate into separate banks, or banking contracts, that are designed to meet their unique needs. This paper shows this is not the case. Instead, agents who are "less attractive" as depositors, because they are more likely to need to withdraw their funds at an earlier time, will tend to disrupt the ability of a bank to serve more attractive customers.
When depositors face ex ante uncertainty about their timing of consumption, banks are able to provide insurance against this uncertainty, also known as liquidity provision. However, when agents with di¤erent withdrawing needs are introduced, an adverse selection problem arises. Short-term deposits, which are less attractive to banks, have the incentive to join the contract o¤ered to the ex ante uncertain customers. This will limit the ability of banks to provide insurance against uncertain withdrawal needs. When these short-term deposits a large enough, the insurance function of banks will be completely eliminated. On the other hand, potentially bene…cial long-term deposits will stay out of the …nancial system.
When the quantitiy of short-term deposits is unpredictable, as in environments similar to Smith (2002) and Antinol… and Keister (2006) , a banking crisis may happen. When su¢ ciently large short-term funds are deposited,.bank reserves are exhausted and long-term investments need to be disrupted. The resulting crisis then has strong negative consequences for the entire economy. 1 Incentive compatibility constraints that produce contracts where short-term funds choose not to deposit will prevent banking crises, but at the cost of losing the insurance function of banks. Restricting short-term deposits may not be optimal at all times, since the cost of doing so may be greater than the expected loss in allowing crises to occur with positive probability.
Other papers have reached related results in di¤erent environments. Fecht and Martin (2005) develop a model in which the degree of liquidity insurance o¤ered to households through banks'deposit contracts is restrained by households'…nancial market access. They …nd that improved …nancial market access may reduce welfare by reducing risk sharing. Similarly, Jacklin (1987 Jacklin ( , 1993 shows that the insurance function provided by demand deposit contracts completely disappears if trading opportunities are introduced. Von Thadden (1997) develops a model where time is continuous, and shows that if agents are allowed to withdraw and re-invest their funds, the insurance function may not be incentive compatible. In our model, introducing heterogeneous agents reduces provision of liquidity, but does not completely eliminate it for small quantities of short-term deposits. For large quantities, the optimal bank contract will completely eliminate the service of liquidity provision.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and the benchmark, …rst-best allocation problem of the banks. The e¤ect of short-term funds on the …nancial system is discussed in section 3. In section 4 we add aggregate uncertainty about withdrawal demand and discuss its implications. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Environment
The model is a two asset version of the models developed by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , where two types of agents are introduced. 2 The economy is populated by a continuum of agents. Time is discrete and there are three periods indexed by t =0; 1; 2. Agents are endowed one unit of a single good when young, and nothing in periods 1 and 2. They care only about consumption in periods 1 or 2, and are expected utility maximizers. Their utility has the form u(c) = c
(1 ) =(1 ), with the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion > 1.
There are two types of agents, who di¤er only in the time they learn their liquidity preference shock. Type a (uninformed) agents are uncertain in period 0, at the time investment decisions are made, about their preferences over consumption at dates 1 and 2. They learn whether they will want to consume in period 1 or 2 at the beginning of period 1. Let a 1 and a 2 be the total population of type a impatient and patient agents, respectively, with
There is no aggregate uncertainty for the total population or the share of domestic impatient and patient agents.
In contrast, type b (informed) agents know at the time they are born whether they will prefer to consume in periods 1 or 2. We label 3 Agents'type (a or b) is observable. Finally, the liquidity preference shock is private information for both types of agents.
Both types of agents have access to a linear production technology whereby one unit of the good invested in period 0 yields R > 1 units of the good at time 2. This technology is illiquid, in the sense that an investment that is interrupted in period 1 generates r < 1 units of consumption. In addition, there is a liquid storage technology, whose return is equal to 1 in both periods. In this sense, the liquid asset dominates the production technology in the shortrun, while investing in the production technology dominates the liquid asset in the long-run.
The timing of events follows. At the beginning of period 0, young agents receive their endowments, and the informed type b agents learn their liquidity preference. Agents then choose their portfolio allocation, i.e. the mix of storage and the illiquid investment. In period 1, type a agents learn whether they will want to consume in periods 1 or 2. Following this, period 1 consumption occurs, where the illiquid technology may be liquidated in order to be consumed. In period 2 the long-term investment technology matures, and patient agents consume.
Banks
Banks arise endogenously in our environment as a coalition of type a agents. This is because uninformed agents bene…t from pooling their resources in order to overcome idiosyncratic uncertainty, and they gain from insuring themselves against their liquidity preference shock. In contrast, informed agents face no uncertainty at the time the investment decision is made, and thus have no need to pool their resources, nor require insurance.
Banks announce contracts in period 0, which specify returns to depositors that depend on their liquidity preference (early vs late-withdrawers) reported by agents. After young agents deposit their endowments with banks, banks use these deposits to save in the liquid asset and make investments in the production technology. In period 1, type a depositors learn whether they will withdraw in period 1 or 2. Following this, banks pay to agents who wish to withdraw early. In period 2 the long-term investment matures, and banks dispense payments to the patient agents.
Consider initially as a benchmark, a separated world. That is, banks will be able to o¤er a contract to type a uninformed agents only, where informed agents do not participate.
Let denote the share of bank's liquid reserves. Denote c a 1 and c a 2 as consumption for type a early and late-withdrawers, respectively. Then, the problem of the bank is
subject to
Where (2) and (3) are the resource constraints, and (4) is the incentive compatibility or truth-telling constraint. (5) is the participation constraint, where V aut is the indirect utility of type a agents behaving in autarky. Given constant relative risk aversion preferences, the solution to this problem sets the share of liquid reserves as
Type b informed agents, in contrast, are able to achieve their optimal outcome without the need for banks. Young type b agents that know they will want to withdraw in the …rst period, can simply acquire the liquid asset, while late-withdrawers can invest all of their endowment in the illiquid technology in order to realize higher returns. Thus, consumption for type b agents in a separated world will be c
In contrast, (6) implies that the returns for type a agents will have c a 1 > 1; and c a 2 < R: The fact that returns di¤er across types may generate the incentives for agents to misrepresent their type.
Uninformed type a agents choose to deposit all of their endowments in banks, since the expected utility of an agent whose funds are intermediated will be greater than the expected utility when they behave autarkically, i.e. V a > V aut . This is because …nancial intermediation in this model provides two services.
First, banks prevent suboptimal holding of assets. A coalition of agents takes advantage of the law of large numbers. Namely, while for individual agents is a probability, for banks it is a known share of agents. Therefore, banks could o¤er c a 1 = 1 and c a 2 = R; an allocation not attainable under autarky. Notice that this is identical to the solution for informed agents. For this instance it is particularly clear to see that a coalition of agents completely resolves the idiosyncratic uncertainty about the timing of consumption, which is the distinction between both types of agents.
Second, banks provide insurance should agents become early-withdrawers. That is, c a 1 > 1. This is achieved at the cost of foregoing some consumption if they are late-withdrawers, where c a 2 < R. This risk-sharing service that is realized through …nancial intermediation is what Diamond and Dybvig de…ne as banks providing liquidity.
Finally, notice that the higher the level of risk aversion, the more agents value liquidity provision. This can be seen by noting that 0 ( ) > 0. As risk aversion increases, in the limit ( ! 1); we have c a 1 = c a 2 , where agents choose to fully insure against early consumption.
Contracts with Both Types of Agents
In this section we examine the more realistic case when type b agents cannot be prevented from participating in the banking contract, if they wish to do so. Recall that types are observable. However, if type b agents stand to gain by depositing in a bank, they can o¤er to share the pro…ts with a type a agent that is willing to deposit for them. While type a agents collectively would like to thwart these associations from happening, at the individual level agents may consider these associations bene…cial. This is the case as long as the marginal payo¤ from "cheating" is greater than its marginal individual cost. 4 Given this, the problem of a bank now becomes
where is the endogenous share of total impatient depositors given by
In this problem, banks decide whether to allow type b agents to enter by way of choice of the consumption schedule. This is described by the constraints (10) and (11), which are the participation constraints of type b agents, where
and b 2 are the number of impatient and patient type b 0 s that choose to enter, respectively 5 . We begin the process of solving this problem by showing that an adverse selection problem arises, where patient type b agents participating in the banking contract would increase welfare of type a agents, but will never choose to deposit in banks.
The proofs are contained in the appendix. In our problem, > 1 entails that early consumption will be greater or equal to one, and by feasibility, late consumption will be less than or equal to R. 6 Since the return for patient type b's in autarky equals R, they will not enter the banking contract. In contrast, impatient type b agents may have the incentive to enter, depending on the value of c 1 chosen by banks, as described by the constraint (10) .
Having ruled out the participation of patient type b's, we turn our attention to the bank's problem where only impatient type b's may want to deposit in a bank. Consider initially the pooling case where banks opt to let type b's enter, that is
In this case, the solution to (7) sets the optimal reserve ratio, which we label p ; as
1 1=
(1
5 Truly, when c 1 = 1; )
, where type b's are indi¤erent between entering or not. In this case we assume for simplicity that they choose not enter. 6 This result is reversed for 2 (0; 1); where c 1 < 1 and c 2 > R; and thus patient type b's choose to enter the banking contract while the impatient choose not to participate. 
(14)
Proposition 3 De…ne the threshold
Then the solution to the bank's problem is the contract (c 1 ; c 2 ) given by
The solution portrays the trade-o¤ between the bank's contract providing insurance and the loss of resources to type b agents who exploit this service. When type a agents implement a risk-sharing contract, they redistribute resources from late to early-withdrawers. Therefore, when informed early-withdrawers enter this contract, they are receiving transfers from type a late-withdrawers. This unintended transfer of goods reduces the welfare of type a agents. This adds another layer to the adverse selection problem: detrimental short-term type b deposits participate in the banking contract, while, as noted above, bene…cial patient type b 0 s choose not to participate. For a small enough share of type b agents, type a agents will prefer the loss of transferring some resources rather than give up the insurance service. Conversely, for shares of type b impatient agents greater than b b 1 , agents will prefer the self-selection outcome. Here the cost of subsidizing type b's consumption exceeds the bene…ts of insurance, so separation is chosen.
Notice that the threshold b b 1 given by (15) is increasing in a 1 , and R. That is, when a 1 is large, then a bigger share of agents bene…t from insurance and thus the threshold at which they want to give it up is larger. 7 Also, the higher the degree of risk aversion, the more agents value insurance, and thus are less willing to sacri…ce this function of banks. In the limit we have that as ! 1; b b 1 ! 1. Finally, the higher the return on the production technology, the higher intertemporal transfers, and thus the threshold at which domestic agents are willing to give up insurance is raised.
Lastly notice that while insurance is reduced in the pooling case, or is completely lost for the separating case, type a agents still prefer to deposit their endowments in banks. This is so since the other service banks provide, e¢ cient intertemporal investment, is still achieved. However, as r ! 1, V ! V aut for
That is, as the potential cost of holding the production technology disappears, banks lose their role when they do not provide insurance.
Banking Crises
In this section we assume aggregate uncertainty about withdrawal demand, similar to Smith (2002) and Antinol… and Keister (2006) . Here we assume that the quantity of type b agents, b 1 is now a random variable whose realization is unknown at the time banks make the portfolio decision. As in the previous section, patient type b agents will never …nd it optimal to deposit in banks for > 1 . The timing of events follows. Banks announce contracts in period 0. Based on the contract banks o¤er, agents choose whether to deposit or not. Banks then receive deposits and choose the portfolio allocation. After type a depositors learn their type, agents who wish to withdraw early report to banks, at which time b 1 is revealed. Following this, banks pay to agents based on this new information. In period 2 the production technology matures, and banks dispense payments to the remaining patient agents.
as the total share of impatient agents, its value drawn from a distribution G( 1 ) with pdf g( 1 ), which is common knowledge, and with …nite support in the interval [ a 1 ; 1]. Then, the bank's problem is given bỹ
subject to Here again, it is feasible for domestic banks to choose a separating contract by announcing c 1 such that the incentive compatibility constraint
is satis…ed. Then type b agents choose not to enter, and thus = a 1 . It follows that by no aggregate uncertainty, (21) becomes u(c 1 )
u (1); which binds at c 1 = 1; as in the previous section. 8 Consider now the pooling case where type b agents choose to deposit their endowments. Here we have = 1 , which implies aggregate uncertainty. That is, banks learn the share of early-withdrawers only after the portfolio decision has been made.
We start by solving for the optimal fractions of reserves and investments that banks liquidate, and : E¢ ciency in holding investments dictates that if < 1; then = 0; and if > 0 then = 1:
When demand for liquidity is relatively low, banks will have excess reserves, and some reserves will be forwarded to the next period.
The optimal fraction of reserves banks liquidate, ; needs to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint c 2 c 1 : Substituting (18) and (19) into this constraint and solving for with = 0, we arrive at the optimal reserves liquidation strategy
where
is the threshold below which < 1; and follows from solving for 1 in the incentive compatibility constraint, setting = 1 and = 0.
1 is the kink in the constraint set, above which all reserves are given to impatient agents.
To …nd the investment liquidation strategy, , note that it will not be optimal for banks to liquidate investments as long as
That is the point at which marginal rate of substitution between liquidating investments and allowing them to mature is less than or equal the marginal rate of transformation. Substituting (18) and (19), noting that u 0 (c 1 ) = c 1 for our CRRA utility form, and solving for with = 1 in (24) we have the optimal investment liquidation strategy
where the threshold
is the point at which M RS = M RT with = 0 and = 1. Substituting the optimal and into the bank's budget constraints (18) and (19) ; we arrive at the optimal return schedule in the pooling case
We now solve for the optimal reserve ratio , by substituting the return schedule above into the objective function(17) : Then the bank's objective function for the pooling case can then be written as
where the optimal share of liquid reserves is implicitly de…ned by the solution to this problem.
Banks in this case provide full insurance for withdrawal demand in ( a 1 ; 1 ). Here, <1 and some liquid reserves will be forwarded to the next period. For withdrawals in ( 1 ; 1 ) , reserves are exhausted, and impatient get lower returns than patient agents. However, = 0 so that no early liquidation of the production technology is carried out. Lastly, when withdrawal demand exceeds 1 , > 0 where banks interrupt the production process in order to satisfy the increased share of early withdrawals.
Similar to the case where the share of impatient agents is known, expected utility of type a depositors is reduced as type b agents enter the banking contract. In this case this is so for two reasons. First, type a agents that value insurance end up transferring resources to type b agents for low realizations of 1 . Second, here the uncertainty of withdrawal demand potentially forces both assets to be used suboptimally. That is, liquid assets are held in excess for low realizations of 1 ; while for high realizations the production technology is liquidated early. Further, for 1 2 ( 1 ; 1), both services that banks provide, insurance and optimal intertemporal investment, are lost.
Consider a numerical example to illustrate this. 9 Speci…cally, assume a uniform distribution G( 1 ) with pdf g( 1 ) = 1=(1 a 1 ), and consider the following parameters: the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is =4, the share of domestic impatient agents is The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 4
The separating case sets the return vector (c 1 ; c 2 ) = (1; R) with optimal reserves s = a 1 : For the pooling case, the optimal return schedule and the objective function are given by (27) and (28) : Finally, de…neṼ p andṼ s as 9 All computations are performed in Mathematica. Code available upon request.
the values to the pooling and separating indirect utilities. Then the solution to the problem given in (17) satis…esṼ = max
For certain parameters, type a agents will ex-ante prefer the pooling contract where banking crises may occur, while for others they will prefer the separating contract. To illustrate this welfare trade-o¤, consider our previous numerical example. Given these parameters, the indirect utilities areṼ p = 0:172 and V s = 0:173, where the pooling contract is preferred. In contrast, if we lower the return to investments to R =2, leaving all other parameters unchanged, we getṼ p = 0:209 andṼ s = 0:188. It follows that for this case the separating contract is chosen. Similarly, decreasing the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion reduces the parameter set at which the pooling contract is preferred. The contract where agents self-select comes at the cost of losing the service of liquidity provision but allows for optimal intertemporal holding of assets, and a banking crisis will be ruled out. In contrast, the pooling contract will not be able to prevent suboptimal holding of assets, and may or may not be able to provide insurance. That is, for low quantities of type b agents it will provide insurance, but will not be able to for large quantities of unpredicted early withdrawals.
Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ects that heterogeneous agents have on the …nancial system in the context of a demand deposit banking model. When banks are not able to distinguish among agents, informed impatient agents have the incentive to enter the banking contract to take advantage of the insurance service that banks provide, at the expense of uninformed agents. Banks are able to restrict these deposits by way of an incentive compatibility constraint, but at the cost of losing the insurance function of banks. Finally, when the quantity of informed agents is unknown, then a banking crisis may occur. In this case an incentive compatible contract will curtail liquidity provision but also prevent banking crises. Still, the cost of imposing a self selection constraint may outweigh its bene…ts. Given this, it would be interesting to look at ways in which deposits could be restricted without losing the insurance service that banks provide.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
To show that utility is increasing in the number of patient type b agents,
Next notice that the …rst order condition to our problem given by (7) sets
Now taking V 0 ( ) from (7) ; and setting it to < 0; we have
after some algebra, substituting in (29) and taking the natural log to the remaining expression, we have
Since a 1 > in this case, and R > 1; both expressions inside the logs are greater than one, and thus their log expressions are positive. Thus the above expression is always true for > 1; since the lhs > 0 and the rhs < 0: (1
after some algebra and taking the natural log to the remaining expression, we have
Which is a contradiction for > 1, since both expressions inside the logs are greater than one, and thus their log expressions are positive.
Proof of Proposition 2:
For c 1 ; …rst notice that increases with we have c 1 = 1:^ is lambda's upper bound, beyond it type a agents will choose to self select. Since c 0 1 does not change signs, and c 1 goes from greater than one to equal to one as lambda increases, we have c 0 1 ( ) < 0 always.
For the second part of the proposition, it is straightforward to sign the derivative of p ; so that p0 ( b 1 ) > 0 always.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The optimal reserve ratios that solve for the pooling and separating outcomes are p and s given by (13) and (14) 1 is small enough so that is arbitrarily close to a 1 . It follows that p is arbitrarily close to the benchmark a given by (6) . Thus V pool is arbitrarily close to V a , and the pooling contract is preferred to a separating contract. Then, by continuity, the threshold b 
Proof of Proposition 4:
The derivation of the separating and pooling cases closely follow the discussions in the body of the paper. For the remaining part, consider a degenerate distribution G( 1 ) that places mass 1 to an arbitrarily small 
